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Intergovernmental Cooperation for 
Mission-Oriented Information Systems: 
A Memoir 
John E. Woolston 
Abstract 
This frankly personal account is based on my involvement in 
negotiarions, design, and development for international biblio- 
graphic systems to support rhree different missions: fostering 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy (International Nuclear Infor- 
nia~ion System, or- INIS); supporting research, development, and 
better practices in agriculture (Internarional Information Sys- 
tem for the Agricultural Sciences and Technology, or AGRIS); 
and improving economic and social conditions in poorer coun- 
tries (Development Sciences Information System, or DEVSIS). 
All rhree designs were based on the concept of decenrralized 
operation: each country reports rhe information in its 
own territory; the merging of this input and the overall man- 
agement are in the hands of an organization in the United Na- 
tions system; and all participants have equal rights to exploit the 
entire database. INIS began in 1970 and is still in steady opera- 
tion; AGRIS started in 1975 and showed quantitative and 
qualitative growth for more than twenty years but has been in 
disastrous decline since its peak in 1996; and DEVSIS, unfol-tu- 
nardy, was not launched on a global scale. Attempts are made to 
identify the conditions-political and rechn i~a l~ l ike ly  to favor 
or frustrate efforts to obtain cooperation among countries for 
the construction of large, essentially comprehensive databases 
and ultimately for sharing knowledge without discrimination 
between rich and poor participants. 
cience and technology were immensely important 
in the prosecution ofworld War IT. The armed forces 
were supported by other government agencies, uni- 
versities, and industrial contractors, and in varying de- 
grees they all became engaged in research, development, 
and implementation. Their efforts needed direction and 
coordination, and the importance of information man- 
agement and delivery became self-evident. Information 
programs were set up within government agencies and 
maintained, after demonstrating their utility, with pro- 
gressive enhancements and sophistication into the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
Similar developments occurred in several countries, 
but we particularly remember those in the United States: 
the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission (AEC), the Nationai Aeionau.;ics and Space 
Adm~nistration, and the Department of Commerce. 
Such activities were the subject of a landmark review 
(President's Science Advisory Committee, 1963), which 
was released from the White House with a foreword 
signed by I'resident John Kennedy. The document is 
usually known as the "Weinberg Report" because Alvin 
M. Weinberg chaired the group that conducted the re- 
view and made the recommendations. 
This report provides a good starting point for the 
developments described in this paper. For example, with 
a clarity that is typical of the entire text, the report ex- 
plains the distinction between "discipline-oriented" and 
"mission-oriented" information systems. Systems defined 
by academic disciplines already had a long history and- 
then as now-were usually the responsibility of the pro- 
fessional organizations serving those disciplines (for 
example, ChernicalAbstracts, a product of the American 
Chemical Society). Typically, the editors sought to im- 
pose high standards, admitting only those publications 
whose scicrltific rigor and novelty had been assured 
by peer reviews. International cooperation among the 
main discipline-oriented systems was managed either 
bilaterally or through the Abstracting Board of the In- 
ternational Council of Scientific Unions. However, co- 
operation did not succeed in overcoming the language 
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barrier. l'hus, for a given discipline much the same con- 
tent would likcly be found in several independent sys- 
tems based on d~fferent national language\ titularly 
English, French, German, and Russian). 
In general, the mission-oriented systems had a much 
shorter history. They were largely based in the United 
States and had grown out of the wartime experience. At 
the time of the Weinberg Report the best known wab 
probably Nuclear Science Abstracts (NSA) ,  which was pro- 
duced by the AEC from its offices in Oak h d g e ,  Ten- 
nessee, and was dedicated to the mission of facilitating 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy (Shannon, 1970; 
Vaden, 1992). The main characteristics distinguishing 
mission-oriented from discipline-oriented systems are well 
illustrated by N S A  and may be summarized as follows: 
MultidiscipZindry materiaL7'he admission of infor- 
mation to a mission-oriented system was determined 
solely by its relevance to the mission. Thus NSA 
contained material drawn from many disciplines: 
physics, chemistry, biology, most branches of engi- 
neering, and some branches of medicine. 
More flexibility in standards: If a document con- 
tained information that had the potential to advance 
the mission, it wouid be admitted to the system with- 
out great regard to editorial standards or whether it 
had passed a peer review. Relevant journal articles 
were, of course, included along with many mimeo- 
!graphed technical reports issued by the institutions 
where the worli had been done. 
Rapidity: Information made available quickly is more 
likely to be useful than information that has been 
delayed. So the managers of mission-oriented sys- 
tems have always sought to minimize the time lapse 
between the receipt of a document and its announce- 
ment by the system. If necessary, this speed would 
be achieved at some sacrifice to the quality of pre- 
sentation, and of course the emphasis on speedy turn- 
around was a great incentive to the mission-oriented 
systems to become pioneers in the use of computers. 
Full-text delivery: In the main, discipline-oriented 
systems announce materials (journals and books) 
that are distributed commercially and are to be found 
in major libraries. Those systems can then focus on 
abstracting and indexing without worrying about 
the availability of the full texts. Not so for the 
mission-oriented systems: it would serve little pur- 
pose to announce a technical report if its full text 
had been produced in only a few copies and if it 
was almost impossible to acquire. Mision-oriented 
systems were therefore driven t i  set up reprographic 
services and to employ developing technologies, such 
as microcards and then microfiches. 
The mission-oriented systems had one huge advan- 
tage. Since they were identified as serving programs of 
national significance, such systems operated as compo- 
nents of government agencies and were able to make 
appropriate claims on big budgets. In the 1950s and 
1960s U.S. government salaries were quite attractive, 
and, for example, high-school science teachers in Ten- 
nessee wereAhappy to take positions with the AEC as 
abstractors and indexers for NSA.  Endowed with skilled 
staff and access to other important resources, it is no 
wonder that the mission-oriented systems were able- 
particularly in the United States-to blaze a trail for the 
computer-based information systems of the future. 
Credit must also be given to individuals, especially 
those who had the responsibility to maintain produc- 
tion and deliver an ever-gowing volume of output. Of- 
ten they were beset by enthusiastic promoters of new 
technologies that, while offering prospects for faster pro- 
cessing and reduced costs, would jeopardize the entire 
operation if they failed. Robert L. Shannon managed 
the production of NSA in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. I was 
told he had been a submarine commander in World War 
11; he certainly knew how to run a tight ship. 
When NSA first started in 1948, most of the avail- 
able literature was in the form of technical reports, most 
ofwhich were from the United States. But ifNSA was to 
fulfill its mission, it needed to grow and to take in all 
rypes of literature from all parts of the world. It quickly 
moved to include the journal articles, and the AEC be- 
gan to establish exchanges with nuclear programs in other 
countries. These arrangements were consistent wit11 Presi- 
dent Dwight Eisenhower's Xtorns for Peace" initiative, 
which led to more exchanges, under which the AEC also 
provided subscriptions to NSA itself. The development 
of N S A  was further accelerated by the series of United 
Nations Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy. At the first of these conferences, held in Geneva 
in 1955, the world watched as countries followed each 
other in releasing vast amounts of information that had 
previously been held secret. More was released at the sec- 
ond conference in 1958, and these actions of "declassifi- 
cation" led to the production of many new books-even 
many new journals-which NSA was quick to notice and 
to bring within the compass of its abstracting service. 
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AS we entered thc 1?6Os, NSA had. become the in- 
disperlsahle tool for libraries serving nuclear scientists 
and technologists throughout the world. And i t  was to 
remain so until 1976; W. M. Vaden (1992) records that 
by 1968 NSA was being fed by exchange agreements 
wirh 316 institutions in 44 foreign countries (P. 21 5). 
But as NSA evolved and grew, its complexity and cost 
had increased more or less in proportion to the quantity 
of literature available. In the 1960s the director of rhe 
AEC's technical information program was Edward J. 
Brunenkant, who had his office and a component of his 
staff in Washington, D.C. Brunenkant realized he would 
probably not be able to secure sufficient resources to 
continue the development and expansion of NSA into 
the future; so he began to search for a mechanism to 
involve other countries in the effort that would be re- 
quired. Such countries as the U.S.S.R., France, and the 
United Kingdom had personnel already skilled in the 
tasks of nuclear documentation, and the Euratom orga- 
nization (one of the forerunners of the European Union) 
had started an ambitious program that would use com- 
puters and innovative techniques for information re- 
trieval. Brunenkant believed that it was time to bring 
these efforts into a unified global program and thus avoid 
the duplication that would result if they became con- 
solidated as separate and independent operations. 
Of course, if one wants others to share the work 
and the costs, one must be ready to yield proportionate 
shares in management and decision making. Brunen- 
kant accepted this, but he sometimes seemed to doubt 
whether he could bring all his staff (and his masters) to 
accept it too. 
Any global cooperative program would certainly 
need to be under the aegis of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), which after years of political 
haggling had been endowed in 1956 with a statute em- 
powering it to "foster the exchange of sciengific and tech- 
nical information" (Fischer, 1997, pp. 35-36). These 
were the years of the cold war: the Soviet Union was 
likely to be suspicious of any initiative coming from the 
United States, and i t  was unlikely even to begin talks in 
any forum other than that of the IAEA. 
The IAEA, headquartered in Vienna, had begun its 
work in 1957, and it had immediately established a Di- 
vision of Scientif c and Technical Information (ST]). A 
"panel') was set up to advise on the work of this division; 
it met annually and was initially composed of one per- 
son from each of the countries identified as the "Big 
Five" on the IAEA's board of governors (Canada, France, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the 
U.S.S.R.). The panel helped the ST1 director to con- 
struct a program and budget that would be accepted by 
the agency's member states, and it enabled the "western" 
members to develop their cooperation with each other. 
However, the Soviet member would usually remain aloof 
from the discussions, especially from anything at all 
speculative about future directions. And the head of the 
division's "Documentation Section" (in those years al- 
ways a Soviet citizen) would insist on a very traditional 
approach to his work. So in the early 1960s, even if 
- 
Brunenkanr had been ready to offer a bold new pro- 
gram to succeed IVSA, the panel would probably not 
have been capable of negotiating the details and reach- 
ing an agreement. 
The third U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy took place in 1964, and Brunenkant 
invited many of the information specialists who had been 
in Geneva to come to a meeting the next week in Stresa, 
Italy. There he and his staff challenged the others to con- 
sider the prospect that the &C would not be able to 
continue NSA in its current forn~  and to think about 
options for the future. It was not clear whether, or to 
what extent, the AEC representatives had formulated 
specific plans in their own minds, but they must have 
been disappointed by their failure to elicit a coherent 
response. 
Brunenkant made one more try, this time with the 
IAEA's panel. E-Ie asked for a special meeting and was 
represented by John Sherrod, his assistant director for 
systems development, who talked enthusiastically about 
new advances in computer technology and his belief that 
they would have enormous implications for bibliographic 
control of world literature. In view of what was subse- 
quently designed and implemented, it seems strange now 
to admit that the other members of the panel were quite 
unable to envisage a system, both international and com- 
puterized, and how it would function. 
Meanwhile, however, and perhaps reacting to the 
fear that the AEC would be unable to continue full cov- 
erage of the world's literature, several countries began to 
contribute descriptive cataloging and abstracts for in- 
corporation in NSA. And recognizing a trend toward 
keyword indexing in other agencies of the U.S. govern- 
ment, the AEC began negotiations wirh Euratom to se- 
cure cooperation in the indexing of the world's nuclear 
literature and the maintenance of an appropriate the- 
saurus. Thus seeds were planted for a program that at 
the globaI level still lacked a clear definition. 
International Nuclear Information System 
(INIS) 
If further progress was to be made, the discussion needed 
to be promoted to another level and, in view of cold war 
antagonisms, to  a level where foreign-policy and diplo- 
matic concerns could be taken into account. Brunenkant 
talked with the State Department. Somehow it was 
agreed that in the summer of 1966 the IAEA would in- 
vite two consultants, one Soviet and one American, to 
meet in Vienna and to stay long enough to explore all 
options and determine whether a program could be de- 
fined that was acceptable to both parties. The U.S.S.R. 
named Lev L. Issaev from its State Committee for the 
Utilization of Atomic Energy, and the United States 
named Raymond K. Wakerling, who was responsible for 
technical information at the Lawrence Radiation Labo- 
ratory and had had considerable experience working with 
the AEC's program. Both were in direct communica- 
tion with their diplomatic missions in Vienna, as well as 
with technical experts. They began to use the name 
"INIS," and they recommended that the IAEA, in con- 
sultation with its member states, try to establish a sys- 
tem to which all of them could adhere. Each country 
would be invited to prepare bibiiographic input for the 
documents produced in its own national territory. 
It became cleat from behind-the-scenes discussions 
that the consultants were describing something that gov- 
ernments could see as a "win-win" situation. Brunen- 
kant's vision of a single global program would be realized, 
and the Soviet Union had conceded that English would 
be the "carrier language" for information to be processed 
by computer; the Soviet Union for its part would get a 
new window on western computer technologies; and by 
cooperating on such a sensitive topic as atomic energy, 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. could give them- 
- 
selves and the rest of the world a glimmer of hope for a 
break in the cold war. 
At this point in the narrative let me explain how 
I cane to be involved in the events described in this 
paper. From 1953 I had been head of "technical infor- 
mation" in Canada's main nuclear research center at 
Chalk River, Ontario: as such I had been present at the 
three U.N. conferences in Geneva, had participated in 
all the meetings of the IAEA's ST1 panel, and had been a 
guest at several sessions of the AEC's Technical Infor- 
mation Panel, as well as its meeting in Stresa. Now I was 
about to take on a more direct responsibiliry, and al- 
though 1 was yet to take up the position, I had been 
selected to be the next director of IMA's S7'1 division. 
So in December 1966, when the Agency convened a 
working group (sixteen countries, three international 
organizations) to maintain the momentum of the Issaev- 
Wakerling recommendations, I was appointed to chair 
the sessions devoted to thr drafting and adoption of the 
meeting's final report. 
The meeting was extraordinary. It was held in the 
IAEA's impressive conference hall, where the partici- 
pants-all essentially information specialists-sat in the 
semicircle of front-row seats that had been designed for 
the IAEA's governors. However, behind each (or most) 
of the partidpants was at least one other person, an offi- 
cial stationed in Vienna and representing that partici- 
pant's own national government. These "advisers" were 
sitting there because their governments saw the meeting 
as a significant political event-and they were very anx- 
ious that it should succeed. Given a chance that the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. would agree to cooper- 
ate, the rest of the world wanted to make sure that no 
obstacle would be put in the way-indeed, that the "tech- 
nical experts" would not be allowed to endanger the re- 
sult by quarreling over trivialities, such as rules for 
bibl~ogra~hic descriptions or the choice of techniques 
for retrieving information by subject! 
This meeting gave support to the concept that, in 
general, each country should take responsibility for re- 
porting the documents produced within its own geo- 
graphic territory and that these various "inputs" should 
be merged to create master files. But most participants 
were thinking of NSA as the standard against which any 
alternative should be judged. They were skeptical about 
the IAEA's ability to meet this standard, and many of 
them would have been content to see INIS as a means 
for giving international status to NSA and enhancing its 
coverage of the whole world's relevant literature. 
Much of the discussion focused on the question of 
whether participating countries should provide abstracts. 
Having already agreed that English would be the lan- 
guage for material processed by computer, the Soviet 
Union was understandably reluctant to take on the huge 
job of translating abstracts for all its own material. At one 
point it seemed that the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
were about to agree that INIS could begin simply as an 
announcement service giving references without abstracts. 
A very respected participant eloquently protested. I no- 
ticed, however, that his intervention was followed by a 
whispered but animated conversation wirh his adviser. 
He asked for the floor again, and when I was able to 
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recognize him, he withdrew everything he had said in his 
first statement. 1.ooking back, 1 think this was the mo- 
ment when we, the information specialists, all realized 
that thc die had been cast: there was going to be some- 
thing called "INIS," and the I M A  would be responsible 
for its management and probably also for its operation. 
Now it was up to us to cooperate and to make compro- 
mises so that the product would be as useful as possible. 
I started work at the IAEA in April 1967. The po- 
litical support was immensely important to the process 
- - 
of getting INIS designed and brought into operation 
(Woolston, 1969; Woolston, Issaev, Ivanov, & Del Bigio, 
1970). Nevertheless, there was no single "boss" to make 
decisions. Everything still had to be decided by consen- 
sus. So we convened working parties on different as- 
pects of the design, and we recruited consultants with 
impeccable technical qualifications. There were plenty 
of arguments, especially by those who foresaw the pros- 
pect of having to change their current practices. But we 
had a deadline for each component of the design, and 
decisions were reached, even if grudgingly on the part 
of some of the participants. 
Brunenkant once told me that during his years at 
the AEC he had spent many hours listening to librar- 
ians and documentalists argue about the relative merits 
of different rules for bibliographic description. He had 
long since concluded that any of the variants would be 
workable and that what really mattered was that every- 
one should adopt the same rules so that data could be 
exchanged or merged without reworking. Fortunately, 
this philosophy ultimately prevailed as each of our dead- 
lines approached. 
One potential stumbling block was the issue of ob- 
taining a "thesaurus." Since INIS would use keyword 
indexing, we needed a structured list of eligible terms. 
Just such a product had been developed by Euratom 
in Luxembourg, and it was far more fully researched 
than anything we could produce in the time available. 
Euratom was an intergovernment organization-one 
forerunner of the present European Union-and the 
member states of Euratom were all member states of the 
IAEA. But Euratom itself had no formal status with the 
IAEA, and in the political climate of the day the Soviet 
Union would have obstructed any attempt to give it such 
status. However, Euratom was justifiably proud of its 
achievement and was not about to let us use the thesau- 
rus without some recognition for its work. 
The person in charge of information at Euratom 
was Rudolf Brke, a German whom I had first met many 
years before in Canada. Wc began to talk and In the 
process got to know and t ~ u s t  each other. We were de- 
termined to find a solution and avoid a political stolm. 
So too was my immediate superior at the IAEA, Ivan 
Zheludev of the U.S.S.R. Tn the end we were able to 
convince our orgarlizacions to accept a rather simple 
process: the IAEA would give a "commercial" contract 
to Euratom to develop and deliver an "INIS thesaurus" 
along with a manual and software, and Euratom would 
host an IAEA staff member to participate in the work 
and to act as liaison with the INIS team in Vienna. 
The ST1 division was responsible for providing com- 
puter service for the entire IAEA, and although there 
were plenty of other applications, many of them grow- 
ing, it was the arrival of INIS that was going to require a 
major upgrade in our hardware. I should not have wor- 
ried: the IAEA's governors approved the purchase of a 
mainframe computer costing about a milliori dollars, a 
significant sum in the 196Os, especially for a biblio- 
graphic system! Nor should I have worried about the 
development of the necessary software. Our staff in- 
cluded a young Italian systems analyst, Giarnpaolo Del 
Bigio, who inspired and led the programming effort; his 
basic concepts can still be traced in INIS as it exists to- 
day and in many of the other systems that followed. 
We often blame politics for delaying or aborting 
good ideas or programs. In the case ofINIS, however, it 
was undoubtedly the political forces that made a good 
thing possible. The first regular product was issued in 
May 1970 (and I returned to Canada a month later). In 
1976, after the content of the printed output, INIS 
Atomindex, had become largely the same as that ofNSA, 
the U.S. authorities discontinued their ow11 publication. 
Thus a highly respected mission-oriented system under 
centralized national management was succeeded by a 
decentralized cooperative system under international 
management. For those involved, this was a momen- 
tous occasion, and testimonials to the twenty-seven-year 
record of NSA have been summarized by Vaden ( I  992, 
pp. 303-306). There was particular justice in the fact 
that the same Edward Brunenkant who had so assidu- 
ously promoted the international option was serving as 
director of IAEA's ST1 division when the transfer was 
consummated. 
Since then INIS has had no significant actual or 
- 
potential competitor. The system has remained in regu- 
lar operation, and the database now contains records 
of 2.3 million documents. Along the road new tech- 
nologies have been adopted to ease the preparation and 
collection of decentralized input, to permit access to the 
database on CII-ROM and over the Internet, and to 
digitize the huge volume ofmaterial contained in a half- 
million full-text documents. l 'he  IAEA has also dcvel- 
oped what seems to be an effective mechanism for the 
governance of INIS. All participating countries name 
their "INIS liaison officers," who meet usually once a 
year. Since these individuals represent the sources of 
input--the very lifeblood of the system-the IAEA 
respects their views and seeks to meet their requirements 
as far as possible. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries-AGRIS 
?'he story of the development and start-up of AGRIS 
should be told by Raymond Aubrac. However, the life 
of this remarkable Frenchman has been so full of drama 
and high adventure that, when he came to write his au- 
tobiography, his editors would not allow him to devote 
more than a few pages to "documentation," a subject 
that they, not he, deemed relatively dull (Aubrac, 1996, 
pp. 341-352). His involvement began in 1964 when, as 
a civil engineer, he came to Rome and to the U.N.'s Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) looking for infor- 
mation he needed for the design of irrigation works in 
Morocco. He met the FAO'S director general, Dr. B. R. 
Sen, and they talked about the waste and duplication 
that occur when useful knowledge, recorded in techni- 
cal reports and produced at great expense, is not put 
within the reach of the people who could use it. Aubrac 
can be convincing, and he was eventually assigned a wide 
range of responsibilities at the FAO, including the direc- 
tion of its information, library, and documentation ac- 
tivities. He succeeded in setting up a computerized system 
to make the FAO's own technical reports more readily 
available (at that time a matter of some several thousand 
new reports per year plus a huge backlog), and he be- 
came passionate about the need to establish national 
docurnentation services in newly independent develop- 
ing countries (Menou, 2004). This task involved pro- 
viding the necessary resources and training and ensuring 
the repatriation of information generated in the former 
colonies but retained by the colonial powers in their 
metropolitan institutions. Long after Aubrac retired from 
the FAO, he was still putting his voluntary effort into 
the establishment and operation of such services. 
Aubrac records that on 6 December 1968 he visited 
the U.S. National Agricultural Library (NAL) and met 
its director, John Sherrod. Sherrod was new in this job, 
having recently transferred from his position in Brunen- 
kant's program at the AEC. Just as he and Brunenkant 
had worried about how to maintain prod~ictiori ofNSA 
and continue comprehensive coverage of the world's 
nuclear literature, so Sherrod was now confronted with 
a similar problem in maintaining NAL's Bibliography of 
Ayirulture. Here too the quantity of literature was in- 
creasing remorselessly and from a much larger base. Vir- 
tually every country in the world was publishing in 
agriculture and of course in many different languages 
(Sherrod, 1984). 
Sherrod told Aubrac about INIS, which was still in 
its design phase at the IAEA. He described the "terri- 
torial" formula, under which each country would be 
responsible For reporting its own publications and docu- 
ments, and how the IAEA would merge these reports 
into a global database freely available to all participants. 
Aubrac was fascinated and eagerly began to explore the 
possibilities of adopting a similar model for an FAO- 
based mission-oriented information system in support 
of the agricultural sector. He  set up an informal work- 
- 
ing party, and seeking advice from many sources, he in- 
vited rile to go from Vienna to Rome early in 1970 to 
give an account of the INIS experience to members of 
his staff. 
The concept of a decentralized, cooperative infor- 
mation system has many attractions. A centralized sys- 
tem needs a big budget to acquire the literature from 
around the world and to employ specialists to select, 
index, and abstract the individual items. l'hese costs must 
be recovered, and the products typically are sold at prices 
that developing countries cannot afford. Conversely, the 
decentralized, cooperative systern requires a relatively 
small budget for its coordinating office, and each coun- 
try, in constructing an inventory of its nationally pro- 
duced information, is doing a job it probably wants to 
do anyway. It employs its own nationals at its own sal- 
ary levels, and having contributed its national records 
to the cooperative system, it receives in return the con- 
tributions of all the other participating countries. 
The name AGRIS was adopted for the proposed new 
information system, but everyone immediately realized 
that constructing it would bi much more difficult than 
constructing INIS. For the nuclear mission there had 
only been NSA at the world level, and the proprietors of 
NSA were ready to abandon it once INIS was fully es- 
tablished. But the agricultural sector was already en- 
dowed with many significant information services. Thus 
there were vested interests that could be expected to see 
AGRIS as a challenge. 
The F A 0  set up a "Panel of Experts on AGRIS" 
under the chairmanship of Sir Thomas Scrivenor, the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation for Mission-Oriented Information Systems 
executive head of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bu- 
reaux (CAB), a group of institutes that were 
a series of abstract journals in key areas of agricultural 
science. Most of the other members of the panel were 
also drawn from existing services. One was John Sherrod, 
who was prepared to yreld NAL.2 Bibliography o&i- 
culture, just as Brunenkant had been ready to yield the 
M C ' s  NSA. Bur I think it is fair to say that, other than 
Sherrod, most members were looking for more rather 
than less business for their own organizations. 
At its first meeting in July 1970 the panel came up 
with a concept that over the years proved quite divisive. 
It ~ r o ~ o s e d  that AGRIS be constructed on two levels: 
level one would be a comprehensive current-awareness 
service in all fields of the FAO's responsibility (thus es- 
sen ti ally equivalent to N M s  Bibliography ofrlgriculture 
plus forestry and fisheries); level two would be "a net- 
work of specialized services which may include special- 
ized information centres, analysis centres and data banks, 
with responsibility in depth for particular subject fields" 
(East, 1971, p. 2). From the start it was evident that 
level two was envisaged, among other things, as a mecha- 
nism to provide international recognition and support 
to the CAB institutes in the United Kingdom and to 
similar bodies in other European countries. 
At a second meeting in January 1971 the panel rec- 
ommended that the FA0  should set up an AGRIS study 
team to report later in the year. Harry East from the 
British organization ASLIB was recruited as its coordi- 
nator. Many individuals and organizations were invited 
to contribute to the study and its report (East, 1971). 
Especially now, rereading the report with hindsight, i t  
seems to involve an elaborate exercise to define a role for 
the services at level two. National participants would be 
asked to identify new literature and report it at level one. 
Would they not also be able to contribute abstracts? Why 
reserve abstracts for a second tier of services? The study 
team danced around this issue, but no one was yet ready 
to tackle it. 
With a go-ahead from the panel at its third meeting 
the F A 0  embarked on the design and construction of 
AGRIS, still with its two levels. Over the next five years 
the development efforts were led by Gerard Dubois, a 
Belgian staff member who was the FAO's chief for bib- 
liographic systems, along with Harry East, who had now 
joined the FA0 team. 
In this narrative I shall attempt to disentangle the 
two levels. Work on level one proceeded constructively, 
and so it became the AGRIS that was operated, largely 
successfully, for the last quarter of the twentieth cen- 
tury. Despite setting up working parties, recruiting con- 
sultants, and welconling experts outposted from their 
countries, the FA0  was unable to develop level two into 
a concrete program. Unforttinately, this failure embit- 
tered some of the original promoters of AGRIS, who 
then withheld their support from the more successfuI 
part of the program. 
Let me explain how I became involved in the AGRIS 
development. Returning to Canada from Vienna in 
1970, I joined an entirely new organization, the Inter- 
national Development Research Centre (IDRC), estab- 
lished and funded by the government of Canada. Acting 
essentially in the tradition of benevolent foundations, 
the IDRC was to use its funds to support research in 
developing countries on issues related to the betterment 
of their economic and social conditions. The president, 
David Hopper, was setting up programs in agriculture, 
health, and social sciences, but he was very conscious 
that scientists in developing countries were usually at a 
great disadvantage with respect to library and informa- 
tion service. He  invited me to develop a parallel pro- 
gram in information sciences. After consulting my new 
colleagues, I quickly came to conclusion that, ifAGRIS 
were to be set up, it could become the cornerstone of a 
program to enhance information service 16r agricultural 
scientists in developing countries. 
Because of my experience with INIS I was full of 
optimism. International cooperative systems would make 
vast stores of information available to the whole world 
without discrimination. The work of building the data- 
bases would be shared by the "territorial" formula, which 
represented an equitable distribution ofcosts. Each coun- 
try would have the same right of access to the outputs, 
irrespective of econornic status. This would be of im- 
mense benefit, particularly for scientists in developing 
countries who could not afford to subscribe to existing 
services, especially when payments had to be in hard 
currencies. Further, by becoming participants, develop- 
ing countries would acquire new skills in recording in- 
formation and also in exploiting it. I saw all this as totally 
consistent with the objectives of the IDRC; so I con- 
tacted Aubrac and offered to help in the building of 
AGRIS and in ensuring access to it for the developing 
countries. 
Aubrac responded positively. He  too was anxious 
that AGRIS should become a tool to help make agricul- 
tural information as readily available in poor countries 
as in rich countries. But i t  was going to be an uphill 
struggle. When the F A 0  director general had set up 
the Panel of Experts in April 1970, he had named nine 
persons: one was from the United States and the rest 
were from Western Europe. I was added to the member- 
ship, but it was to be another three or four years before 
developing countries were represented on the panel. 
Attention was progressively focused on level one. A 
target date of January 1975 was set for the production 
of its first output, and an effort was launched to pro- 
duct. an experimental issue of Agrindex (the proposed 
printed output) to test the validity of the procedures 
and processing. But these procedures and the process- 
ing had not yet been defined in sufficient detail. To help 
meer the schedule, the F A 0  established an AGRIS 
Implementation Advisory Group to work with its own 
staff. I was to be the group's chairman, and the other 
members represented the organizations that were ex- 
pected to be the major contributors of input at start-up. 
They included one person from a developing region, 
Dolores Malugani of the Instituto Interamericano de 
Ciencias Agricolas (IICA), as well as representatives of 
NAL, CAB, the European Communities, Czechoslova- 
kia, and the U.S.S.R. Our first meeting was combined 
with the fourth meeting of the Panel of Experts in May 
1972. However, my most enduring memory of the 
Implementation Advisory Group relates to its second 
meeting, which took piace in Prague in September 1972. 
As chairman, I reminded my colleagues that there 
were only two years and three months before the first 
regular issue of the output was due, and 1 called on them 
to identify the various tasks that had to be completed in 
order to make that possible. As these were identified and 
sequenced, I wrote them on a blackboard with a time 
allocation for each of the phases that had to be com- 
pleted before the next could begin. When we included 
the development of software and the acquisition ofcom- 
puter equipment, it was obvious that we could not meet 
the target date. 
Should we ask the F A 0  for a postponement, or 
should we seek to use software and computer resources 
available elsewhere? Resistance to both alternatives was 
strong, but something had to give. I asked my colleagues 
to allow me to make an informal approach to Brunenkant 
as director of the IAEA's ST1 division and find out 
whether he would be willing to process AGRIS input 
on IAEA facilities in Vienna, assuming the F A 0  and 
the I.&A could reach an appropriate agreement. Our 
last session was in the morning, and our flights out of 
Prague were to be around midday. At the last moment 
and quite grudgingly the Implementation Advisory 
Group gave its authorization. That night I was back in 
Ottawa, and the next morning I phoned Brunenkant. 
Having described what had happened in Prague, I put 
the question. What followed was the longest pause in 
any conversation I can remember. Finally Brunenkant 
broke the silence and said firmly, "Yes, John, 1'11 do it!" 
The next call was to Aubrac. He made the formal 
approach to the IAEA, and since the cooperation was 
agreed in principle, plenty of time was left to work out 
the financial and staffing details. Helga Schmid, who 
had worked for INIS slnce early 1970, was transferred 
to the FA0  staff in 1975 and later became head of the 
AGRIS Processing Unit hosted by the IAEA in Vienna. 
That arrangement lasted for more than twenty years, 
and by sharing resources both systems benefited techni- 
cally and in terms of cost (Marchesi, 1984). It was a rare 
and outstanding example of true cooperation between 
two organizations in the U.N. famlly. 
The decision to have AGRIS processed on INIS 
sofnvare was a great spur to convergence between the 
two systems. If, for example, the FA0 had insisted on 
different rules for bibliographic description, this could 
have required changes in processing and checking rou- 
tines and greatly increased the amount ofwork required 
before start-up. Nevertheless, rhe F A 0  still needed to 
accelerate the business of documenting the rules for in- 
putting to AGRIS, and its success was demonstrated 
when the experimental issue of Agrindex came out in 
September 1973. This issue contained 6,659 records 
contributed by 12 countries and I7 institutions, and it 
had been processed in Vienna under the INIS system 
(Dubo~s, 1984, pp. 57-58). 
The cooperation with INIS virtually confirmed the 
adoption of English as the "carrier language" for AGRIS 
computer processing, a decision that NAL had also made 
mandatory for securing its participation. Participating 
countries would thus be required to translate the titles 
of their documents if these were not already in English. 
Over the years this requirement imposed a burden that 
fell unfairly on some countries much more than others, 
and it seriously diminished the coverage of non-English 
literature. For example, as recently as the late 1990s 
Mexico was reporting only those of its documents for 
which the publishers had provided titles with English 
translations. The Mexican input center did not have the 
capacity to translate the titles of the many eligible docu- 
ments published with Spanish-only titles. After AGRIS 
had been in operation for a few years and it had adopted 
indexing with descriptors from a multilingual the- 
saurus, I began to argue that it should accept without 
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translation any titles written in the Latin alphabet 
whether original or transliterated (Woolston, 1984b, pp. 
137-139), but mine was a lonely voice. 
As 1973 progressed, more and more countries com- 
mitted themselves to participation, including the Soviet 
Union, which was not even a member of the FAO. Nev- 
ertheless, we in the IDRC were concerned that the sys- 
tem had been designed with very little participation from 
the developing countries. How would they react to what 
was being proposed? So the F A 0  and the IDRC agreed 
to cosponsor a meeting in Kome that would be com- 
posed entirely ofagricultural information specialists from 
developing countries. It was timed to coincide with the 
appearance of the experimental issue of Agrindex and 
before the AGRIS system design was to be finalized at 
the end of 1973. 
Mr. M. Moulik, who had formerly headed the in- 
formation program at the FAO, came out of retirement 
in India to chair the meeting. The other eleven partici- 
pants were persons with responsibility for agricultural 
information programs at various institutions in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. The group managed its own 
discussions, prepared its recommendations, and wrote 
its own report (International Development Research 
Centre, 1974). 
Aubrac, Brunenkant, and I were present among the 
"observers," all ofwhom were pledged not to speak un- 
less asked a direct question. The meeting was one of the 
most exciting I have ever attended. The participants de- 
plored the then existing situation for developing coun- 
tries (a plethora of different bibliographic services, 
overlapping but with many lacunae-and mostly unaf- 
fordable), but then they proceeded quickly to recom- 
mend "Emphasizing that AGRINDEX should not 
become simply an additional current bibliography; it is 
recommended that the essential characteristic of AGNS 
Level 1 be its comprehensiueness in terms of subject mat- 
ter coverage, geographic coverage, and inclusion of all 
types of unpublished and published literature" (Inter- 
national Development Research Centre, 1974, p. 8). 
They went on to make concrete suggestions on the 
structure ofAGRIS and its relation to regional and na- 
tional organizations. They also stressed the importance 
of standards, training, and mechanisms to obtain access 
to primary literature, both the commercially published 
. - 
and the "nonconventional" or "gray" literature. 
The meeting built momentum both in the F A 0  and 
in countries not previously involved. It was particularly 
encouraging for those of us at the IDRC who were rec- 
ommeriding grants to help ensure that developing coun- 
tries would participate from the very start ofAGRIS in 
January 1975. At first we concentrated on those regional 
institutions that had been asked by their member coun- 
tries to act on their behalf in collecting documents and 
preparing input to AGRIS: IICA in Turrialba (later San 
Jose), Costa Rica, and the Southeast Asia Regional Cen- 
ter for Graduate Studies and Research in Agriculture 
(SEARCA) in Los Bafios, the Philippines. The IDRC 
also funded training courses, itinerant experts to visit 
national AGRIS centers and help sort out problems as 
they arose, and a team in Vienna to convert data from 
worksheets into machine-readable form on behalf of 
those developing countries not yet able to do so. 
AGRIS began operation on schedule with a remark- 
- 
able degree of participation from both rich and poor 
countries, as well as from East and West. Nevertheless, 
there were dark clouds on the horizon. In the years pre- 
ceding start-up CAB had embarked on a program of 
modernization, involving collecting together the records 
produced by its various institutes, entering them in 
a common computer system, and generating an all- 
agriculture database that would be marketed through- 
out the world. Thus it was apparent that CAB and 
AGRIS would become competitors, although this was 
rarely admitted, and the relationship was often shrouded 
in hypocrisy. The governments that were members of 
CAB were also members of the FAO, and for a number 
of years some of these governments made arrangements 
with CAB to ~rovide  input to AGRIS on their behalf: 
Both organizations felt some obligation to "cooperate," 
but it was an uneasy relationship given that, if AGRIS 
succeeded in meeting the needs of a substantial number 
of users, that would diminish the market for CAB'S main 
product. The F A 0  was making the AGRIS database 
available to all participating countries, and each of them 
could exploit it freely within its own territory. However, 
CAB was doing all its production within the high-salary 
environment of the United Kingdom and needed to re- 
- 
cover its costs by setting what were, and still are, re- 
markably high prices for its products. 
CAB had, and retains, an excellent reputation for 
the scientific quality of its work. It is selective, seeking 
to report the published material of enduring value, and 
there are many users prepared to pay for such a service. 
By contrast, AGRIS contains what the participating 
countries have decided to submit, including noncon- 
- 
ventional or gray literature (technical reports) that may 
provide early indications of new practical developments 
and details not found in journal articles. But between 
the CAB and AGRIS databases a considerable overlap 
in content would always exist, and as described in the 
last section of this paper, the competition was likely to 
be influenced by promotional and marketing strategies. 
Another cloud that darkened the horizon involved 
NAL and the conditions it imposed for its own partici- 
pation, John Sherrod had left his position while AGRIS 
was still being designed, and he was succeeded first by 
Joe Caponio as acting director and then by kchard Farley 
in July 1974. It seemed that both men were under a lot 
of pressure from the staff of NAL to maintain the status 
quo, and so they decided not to adopt the AGRIS rules 
for bibliographic description, even though the rules had 
been accepted by all the other participants. Well, you 
cannot have a global database without the information 
from a producer as dominant as the United States. So 
Helga Schmid developed programs to massage NAL 
records into AGRIS format, but they still did not have 
as much detail as records from other countries. 
Even more serious was the concern about subject 
control. Many AGRIS participants, especially the Euro- 
peans, wanted the FA0  to develop a multilingual the- 
saurus of descriptors to be used by all participants to 
index their records. However, NAL was opposed, point- 
ing out that its staff members were not agricultural- 
subject specialists and could not be expected to acquire 
a sufficient scientific background and to use such a the- 
saurus effectively. For the start-up of AGRIS a compro- 
mise was negotiated: inputters would index, but only 
according to the "commodities" treated in each item. 
The relevant commodities were usually named in the 
title of the item; so the task involved little more than 
"enriching" titles where necessary, which was more or 
less consistent with N X s  existing practices. 
-. 
Some time after AGRIS started, the issue came up 
again, and the FA0  agreed to launch a project to pro- 
duce a multil~ngual thesaurus called AGROVOC that 
could be used for indexing in AGRIS. Since the descrip- 
tors in different languages would be correlated, this held 
out the prospect of indexing in one language and re- 
trieving in any ofthe others. The same Rudolf BrCe who 
had worked with the IAEA in the production ofthe INIS 
thesaurus had been one of the original members of the 
AGRIS Panel of Experts. By this time he had retired, 
but his team, with Euratom itself, had been absorbed 
into the European Communities. Since the European 
Communities organization was acting as a regional par- 
ticipant within AGRIS and was one of the strongest pro- 
moters of theAGROVOCproject, it was once again logi- 
cal to base the work in Luxembourg. Donald Leatherdale 
of the IDRC was appointed as the project leader, and 
the IDRC recruited a Latin American specialist to work 
on the Spanish descriptors (this was before Spain's entry 
into the European Communities). Specialists from 
France and CAB were also merdbers of the team. 
We had no way of knowing whether NAL would 
accept and use AGROVOC. Unfortunately, it is in the 
very nature of this type of work to seek to avoid ambi- 
guities by proposing descriptors at ever more specific 
levels ("narrower" terms below "broader" terms); I was 
worried that the more complicated AGROVOC became, 
the less likely NAL would accept it. So whenever I saw 
Leatherdale, I pleaded with him to "keep it small, keep 
it simple!" What we did not know was that CAB had an 
ongoing, in-house, undisclosed project to develop avery 
deep, but unilingual, thesaurus for use with its own data- 
base. Then soon after the AGROVOC work was com- 
pleted and the team had been disbanded, CAB released 
~ t s  own product. This coincided with another change in 
direction at NAL; the new director, Joseph Howard, 
announced that, yes, his staff could do subject indexing 
after all-and that they would use the more profound 
CAB thesaurus! Once again Helga Schmid had to write 
special programs, this time to take CAB descriptors and 
convert them to AGROVOC equivalents, unfortunately 
with some inevitable loss of precision. 
In subsequent years the F A 0  cooperated with NAL 
and CAB, as well as with French and Spanish special- 
ists, to maintain AGROVOC and to ensure a maximum 
degree of compatibility with the CAB thesaurus. But a 
project to construct a Universal Agricultural Thesaurus 
foundered because of fundamental differences, both lin- 
guistic and commercial, between the needs of the two 
systems. 
Another serious problem came from within the FA0  
itself and apparently is still not resolved after more than 
a quarter of a century. The F A 0  is a huge organization 
inanaging international programs, not only in agricul- 
ture but also in food and nutrition, forestry, and fisher- 
ies. It is said that back in 1970 the then director general 
had pronounced a dzktat that the scope ofAGRIS should 
cover "all the fields of responsibility of FAO" and that 
the first meeting of the Panel of Experts had oblig- 
ingly endorsed this position. In any case the AGRIS co- 
ordinating team has adhered to it through the years. 
However, within the FAO, there is also a Fisheries De- 
partment, and even before AGRIS was proposed, it had 
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set up a consortium with prominent fishery research 
institutions to provide bibliographic input to the pri- 
vate company that produced Aquatic Sciences and Fish- 
eriesAbstracts (ASFA). So while the FA0 was inviting all 
its member states to contribute information, including 
fisheries information, to AGRIS, it was also inviting some 
of its larger member states to contribute fisheries infor- 
mation to ASFA. The details of the cooperation have 
changed over the years, but at least until recently the 
consortiunl has been. maintained and there has been a 
business arrangement with the current ~roducers  of 
ASFA. 
The AGRIS team has always insisted that it would 
work with only one center for each country. Each coun- 
try had the absolute right to determine where that ten- 
ter would be located. In some countries a government 
department is responsible for both agriculture and fish- 
eries, but in many countries the two sectors are man- 
aged separately. In practice it has proved very difficult 
for national AGRIS centers based in the agricultural 
sector to access the fisheries information as well. Many 
centers have simply not attempted to report fisheries 
information, and the resulting poor coverage has tended 
to compromise the credibility of the whole system. 
i was in fairly frequent contact with the FA0 on 
this issue until 1992, and I found it most frustrating to 
be faced with the same never-changing bureaucratic 
standoff. Top management seemed not to bother as long 
as the pretense was maintained that AGRIS was embrac- 
ing all FA0 interests. A solution should have been found: 
either the F A 0  could have declared that AGRIS was for 
the agricultilral sector and that fisheries would be handled 
separately, or it could have extricated itself from the com- 
mitment to ASFA and allowed countries to nominate a 
second participating center to ensure a satisfactory cov- 
erage of fisheries within AGRIS. It did neither. 
Unfortunately, I must also find fault with the FAO's 
concept of its relationship with the participating ten- 
ters. This contrasted markedly with that of the IAEA, 
where the national INIS liaison officers have a consider- 
able measure of control over the policies and operations 
of their system. However, the same formula might not 
have been practicable for AGRIS, where the number of 
participants has been double or triple the number in 
INIS. 
After the eighth meeting of the AGRIS Panel of 
Experts in 1976 I recommended that, since the mem- 
bers did not represent the participants, it should be dis- 
banded and replaced by a group that would be structured 
more democratically. I had in mind that the participants 
in each region might elect a person to represent them 
for, say, three years in a body that would meet at least 
once a year with the FA0 staff. I also imagined that 
there would be meetings, perhaps every three years, of 
all participants in each region. The FA0  did disband 
the panel but chose to replace it with "consultations" 
held approximately every three years with all participants 
who were able to obtain the means of getting to Rome. 
Many did, which made these gatherings huge, very in- 
timidating for people who had little or no experience 
with the international environment. The F A 0  staff sat 
high on a dais above the participants on the floor of a 
great hall, and the chairman, whose election was usually 
arranged by the F A 0  staff, often had little experience 
with the role and was dependent on whispered advice. 
Both during and between these "consultations" the FAO's 
posture was needlessly "top-down,"'which gave the par- 
ticipants little sense of ownership of AGRIS. 
I have detailed some of the problems, not to blame 
individuals afrer all these years but as a basis for drawing 
conclusions in the last section of this paper. In fact, de- 
spite the problems AGRIS forged ahead. Particularly in 
smaller countries it provided a new motivation and con- 
fidence among librarians and docu~nentalists who had 
previously felt isolated. Many AGKIS inputters were 
quasi-volunteers who made the effort because they 
wanted to cooperate with their colleagiles in other coun- 
tries, even though they would not be remunerated for 
the extra work. 
In 1974 Aubrac went on special assignment to the 
U.N. in New York; the direction of the FAO's AGRIS 
team was first taken over by Nicolae St. Dumittescu from 
Romania and several years later by Emile Samaha from 
Lebanon. Both directors maintained a strong commit- 
ment to the system and made special efforts to assist the 
participants in poorer countries: they organized train- 
ing for hundreds of individuals and, for example, were 
often able to secure donor-funded technical assistance 
for the participating institutions (Portegies-Zwart & 
Samaha, 1993; Menou, 2004). In 1980 the FA0  re- 
sponded to the wishes of many participants and began 
accepting abstracts for incliision in the database. Then 
from 1982 to 1986 AGROVOC indexing was phased 
in, allowing users to interrogate the system in any one 
of three languages-English, French, or Spanish (Lebo- 
witz, Portegies-Zwart, & Schmid, 1991). NACs Bibli- 
ography ofApiculture had been replaced by an electronic 
service, Agricok and most of its items of U.S. origin 
were contributed to AGKTS. NAL was also progressively 
scaling down its coverage of non-U.S. items as AGRIS 
was building up its own; so for some years we were on 
track toward Sherrod's original goal. 
New ways were found to exploit the database. Some 
participants downloaded records on particular topics and 
published periodic bibliographies; being participants, 
they were free to do this without paying royalties. Egypt 
was one of the countries that produced a regular na- 
tional agricultural bibliography by downloading from 
AGRIS; the output included not only the records con- 
tributed by Egypt but also those from other countries 
if the subject concerned Egypt or if the author worked 
ar an Egyptian institution. When the CD-ROM tech- 
nology arrived, Samaha responded quickly: every par- 
ticipating center was given the entire database with 
periodic updates, and it also became available in many 
other institutions, including institutions in developing 
countries for which Samaha had negotiated 
tariffs. 
Now I must return to the question of "level two." In 
1975, after Scrivenor had retired, the FA0  reconstructed 
the Panel of Experts; I was made chairman, and at last 
we had significant representation from developing coun- 
tries. As previously mentioned, the F A 0  had hosted a 
series of studies in response to suggestions made by ex- 
isting services, usually involving CAB and other institu- 
tions in Western Europe, especially France and the 
Netherlands. Each study related to a broad swathe of 
topics within the subject scope of AGRIS, such as "for- 
estry" and "tropical agriculture," and it enabled the ex- 
isting services to explore how they might cooperate with 
each other. Nevertheless, the products they envisioned 
were still predominantly bibliographic. As compared 
with level one, more judgment would be exercised at 
level two to select items of enduring value, the indexing 
would be deeper, and abstracts would be added. Since 
many of us were anticipating that deeper indexing and 
abstracts would likely be added to level one, these level- 
two proposals seemed to offer only marginal improve- 
ments and would still result in high-cost products. At 
the last meeting of the Panel of Experts in May 1976 we 
considered a proposal for an "AGRIS Tropical" system, 
and while we encouraged the existing services to con- 
tinue their search for ways to cooperate, we decided not 
to recommend that the F A 0  be responsible for setting 
up the proposed system (Woolston, 1977). 
However, at the IDRC we had clearly accepted that 
a giant bibliographic system such as AGRIS could not 
meet all the information needs in the agricultural sec- 
tor. Users also wanted data; news; advisory services; 
directory-type information on persons, institutions, pro- 
grams, and projects; and both the analysis and synthe- 
sis of published information. So if there was going to 
be a level two, it should do much more than provide 
a better bibliographic service. Further, any effort to 
broaden the range of services should be linked to a sharp 
focus on a specific subject, since no set of providers could 
be experts on many different topics. This brought us 
back to th$ Weinberg Report, which includes two 
often-quoted pages on "specialized information centers" 
(President's Science Advisory Committee, 1963, pp. 32- 
33). In a forthright but controversial statement the au- 
thors advocated that any such center should not be set 
up in a library but rather that it should be staffed by 
scientists and be located within an eminent research 
team already focused on the subject. In that environ- 
ment staffmembers could be involved in both the analy- 
sis and synthesis of information, and they would have 
access to the knowledge and experience that would en- 
able them to evaluate information and data, make quali- 
tative judgments, and offer authoritative advice. For any 
given specialized subject we can speak of an "invisible 
college" of individuals who-in order to serve their 
- 
common interests-communicate by e-mail and tele- 
phone, exchange reprints of their publications, visit each 
other's laboratories, and meet at the relevant confer- 
ences. An information center on the Weinberg model 
could become a major resource for the "invisible col- 
lege," perhaps even its headquarters, and be an engine 
for progress in its field. 
The IDRC was able to help fund some specialized 
information centers, more or less according to the Wein- 
- 
berg model, at research institutions in developing coun- 
tries on particular crops (e.g., cassava, coconuts, and 
sorghum and millets) and on a particular agricultural 
practice (irrigation). In the paper already referenced 
(Woolston, 1977), I offered the IDRC's full coopera- 
tion if the FA0  would set up a consultative mechanism, 
involving donors and scientists, to identify priority top- 
ics for new centers and to seek appropriate funding. My 
offer was not taken up, and I must admit that the early 
vigor of most of the IDRC-funded specialized centers 
was diluted with time; they tended to be absorbed into 
the libraries of their host institutions, and the scientists 
drifted away. 
Intergovernmental Cooperation for Mission-Oriented Information Systems 
Economic and Social Development - DEVSIS 
Since DEVSIS was never launched on a global scale, 
this story will be briefer than those for INIS and AGlUS. 
However, even before the IDRC came into existence, 
many agencies knew that their efhrts to improve condi- 
tions in developing countries were impeded by a lack of 
organized information, and the deficiency had been high- 
lighted in a landmark report by Sir Robert Jackson for 
the United Nations (1969, vol. 2,  pp. 215-278). The 
. - 
evidence was overwhelming that ignorance of what had 
already been done was leading to unacceptable levels of 
waste and duplication. But relevant information was 
being recorded by a host of agencies, some in the devel- 
oping countries themselves, for example, the Ministries 
of Planning. The other producers included various U.N. 
bodies and the development banks, the "aid" agencies 
of richer countries, the many benevolent nongovernmen- 
tal organizations, and the academics who carried out 
- 
surveys and research. Most of the resulting documents 
- 
were not commercially published, and as gray literature 
they were usually printed in small quantities and failed 
to be noticed by the discipline-oriented systems. If ever 
there had been a case for a cooperative mission-oriented 
system, here i t  was! 
Since the IDRC was a new organization, we first 
needed to make contact with those who already had ex- 
perience in managing information about development 
issues. Various agencies were producing bibliographic 
services to cover particular facets of the overall mission. 
They had found that they needed to separate the over- 
arching issues of development in general from the often 
more technical issues related to development in indi- 
vidual sectors. Jean Viet, working with the Development 
Center of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co- 
- 
operation and Development), had suggested how this 
could be done; so one of the IDRC's first-g-anrs was to 
- 
enable him to produce a multilingual Macrothesaurus 
for any mission-oriented system on the overarching is- 
sues, while incorporating terrns to ensure connection and 
compatibility with thesauri for sysrems in particular 
sectors. 
Within the IDRC we also realized that if we were 
going to work with other organizations and with poor 
countries to build information systems on economic and 
social development, we should begin acquiring experi- 
ence of our own. Fortunately, we were going to build a 
new library in Ottawa--one unconstrained by existing 
practices-and we saw that this could be a laboratory 
for testing methods of cataloging, indexing, and com- 
puter processing. Arthur and Marianne Vespry, our first 
librarians, were cnthusiastic, and we knew that we would 
need to take account of emerging international standards 
and employ the most appropriate software and hard- 
ware so long as it was available for use anywhere in the 
world. We developed relations with Adam Wysoclti from 
Poland, who was heading UNESCO's UNISIST pro- 
gram and encouraging the adoption of standards and 
compatible practices for all scientific and technical infor- 
mation systems. And after evaluating various other 
bibliographic systems, we recognized the preeminence 
of the ISIS package for library management and in- 
formation retrieval, which had been developed by the 
International Labour Office in Geneva. In those years 
(early 1970s) ISIS needed a big IBM mainframe com- 
puter, and for this we bought time in a service bureau. 
The International Labour Office licensed us to use its 
sofnvare, and it also signed an agreement allowing us to 
introduce ISIS to developing countries and to provide 
them with training and support services. 
As the IDKC took on staff members (program of- 
ficers and computer specialists), and as these traveled to 
international organizations and to developing countries, 
we were gradualiy acquiring the knowledge and contacts 
that would enable us to offer proposals for common 
action. As director of the IDRC's Information Sciences 
Division, I made special efforts to find out how "devel- 
opment" information was handled in developing coun- 
tries and to discuss their needs with key individuals in 
the U.N. organizations. By Iate 1973 and after full dis- 
cussion with the IDRC's president and governors I felt 
ready to launch an initiative proposing more effective 
international cooperation in the handling of develop- 
ment information. A concept paper was widely distrib- 
uted in January 1974 (Woolston, 1974). The response 
was remarkably positive, and six months later the IDRC 
was joined by the OECD and UNESCO in convening a 
large meeting in Ottawa ofthe interested parties. Aubrac 
chaired the meeting in his personal capacity. 
The Ottawa meeting endorsed the name "DEVSIS" 
for a mission-oriented system that would attempt to 
organize information on the issues of economic and so- 
cial development. It called for the establishment of a 
steering committee to oversee the work of a study team. 
UNESCO became the convener of the steering com- 
mittee; Paul-Marc Henry, president of the OECD De- 
velopment Center, was named as its chairman. At the 
request of the steering committee, the IDRC released 
me to be director of the study team. The lDRC also 
assigned Kate Wild, who had previously worked at the 
OECD Developn~ent Center and with Jean Viet on the 
Macrothesaurus; she had also been our key person in es- 
tablishing the ISIS facility, which was now processing 
the IDRC's library records. 
The lnternational Labour Office, having recently 
occupied its new building in Geneva, offered to make 
space and facilities available for the study team and to 
assign George Thompson, its chief librarian, to prepare 
for the arrival of the team and to be its deputy director. 
We began work in March 1975 and continued through 
September. Full details of the membership of the steer- 
ing committee and study team are given in a final report 
(LIEVSIS Study Team, 1976), which was published on 
behalf of the six cosponsors: the IDRC, the International 
Labour Office, the OECD, the U.N. Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, the U.N. Development 
Programme (UNDP), and UNESCO. 
The final report goes into extensive detail describing 
a system with two files, the first bibliographic and the 
second to fac~litate "referrals" to other established sources 
of information. Much of the detail was based on the INIS- 
AGRIS experience and, for the first file, on the concept 
of decentralized input paralleling the INIS-AGRIS terri- 
torial formula. DEVSIS would seek to be consistent with 
the objectives of the UNISIST program and thus be- 
come compatible with INIS and AGRIS and other 
sectoral systems that might be developed in the future. 
We sought a home for the central DEVSIS office in a 
U.N. organization, and our preferred option involved 
locating the processing work with INIS and AGRIS in 
Vienna. Incidentally, the Vienna International Center was 
then under construction, and it was to become the head- 
quarters for the LAEA and all other U.N. bodies in that 
city; they were to share a common library and computer 
and printing facilities, and I was not the only person who 
was dreaming that the Vienna International Center would 
eventually have the equipment and staff to run a full- 
scale processing operation for a growing number of in- 
ternational mission-oriented information systems. 
How to fund DEVSIS? This was to become the de- 
termining factor. It had not been much of an issue for 
INIS and AGRIS: the costs of their central operations 
were borne on the regular budgets of the IAEA and the 
FAO, respectively. But there was no single U.N. agency 
with overall reponsibility for economic and social devel- 
opment, and the study team had estimated a total of 
$1.6 to $2 million to cover the central costs of DEVSIS 
operations for the first three years. Louis Shapiro, a Ca- 
nadian, who was director of management information 
services at UNDI', was also a member of the DEVSlS 
steering committee. As early as 1974 he had sketched in 
a notional figure for a UNDP "Global Project," which 
was the steering committee's preferred option for financ- 
ing DEVSIS for the initial period. Unfortunately, 1975 
was the year when the U N D P  encountered a financial 
crisis. The world economy was entering a period of in- 
flation after a long period of general stability, and the 
costs of field operations funded by the UNDP were far 
exceeding budget expectations. So the agency was forced 
to forgo new commitments. Of course the same infla- 
tionary tredd was affecting all cosponsoring agencies, 
and the steering committee was not able to identify an 
alternative source of funds. 
This was a sad outcome for the many people who 
had invested a lot of time and energy in what they be- 
lieved was a much-needed system. Some relatively small 
DEVSIS-type operations were established: in the U.N. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in New York 
City; in the U.N. Ecorlomic Commissions for Africa 
and Latin America (with a branch operation in the Car- 
ibbean); and at the IDRC (for the Canadian material). 
However, there was no coming together of these opera- 
tions nor any involvement of the big information pro- 
ducers, such as the World Bank and the development-aid 
organizations in richer countries. 
A Summing Up 
Thirty years ago we still looked mainly to governments 
to manage major programs in applied science, and when 
these programs involved international coordination, we 
would rely on the intergovernmental agencies created 
for just this purpose. Thus throughout the 1970s and 
into the 1980s I was a convinced advocate of the INIS- 
AGRIS model for mission-oriented information systems 
(Woolston, 1984a). I was accepting invitations to write 
articles and speak at conferences, and I would try to ex- 
plain how such systems would be more efficient than 
the traditional models and would save unnecessary work 
for people all over the world: how, by recording infor- 
mation in the country where it was produced, it would 
be entered in the database more quickly and without 
waiting for documents to be ordered and transported to 
a central location; how a (nearly) comprehensive service 
in a given sector would obviate the need to search 
through several partially complete services, as well as 
avoiding the cost ofobtaining them; and how, once stan- 
dards had been adopted by consensus among the par- 
ticipants, the same document would no longer require 
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cataloging in all the libraries that acquired it-now they 
could simply download the standard record from the 
international system. 1-0 give an actual example of this 
last point, the institute with which I am currently asso- 
ciated has a computerized library catalog ofalmost forty 
thousand records, a quarter ofwhich were taken directly 
from AGIUS, and this proportion could have been sig- 
nificantly higher if the practice had begun sooner. 
Above all, the INIS-AGRIS formula gives each coun- 
try the possibility to participate. Through its represen- 
tation in the international agency each country can have 
a voice in the policies governing the system, and by tak- 
ing responsibility to report its own national literature, it 
makes the ultimate decision on what to enter and what 
to leave out. It has a piece of the action. 
In the 1970s there was considerable concern for the 
relative disadvantages suffered by the poorer countries, 
many of them newly independent, only recently released 
from colonialism. Resolutions of the United Nations 
called for a "new international economic order," and 
within such statements were demands for "the sharing 
of knowledge on the basis of equity." I would try to ex- 
plain how the INIS-AGRIS model provided for just such 
equity. Each country was required to contribute only 
the information produced in its own territory (hence in 
proportion to the extent of its activities within the scope 
of the system). Each country would take from the sys- 
tem whatever it could use (and hence again likely to be 
in proportion to the extent of these activities). So big 
countries would contribute a lot, but use a lot; little 
countries would contribute a little and use a little: is 
that not "equity"? At one meeting Lee Burchinall-not 
unkindly-described this as "John Woolston's quaint 
Marxism," and as long as he retained the adjective, I 
had no reason to quarrel with his verdict. 
But was I naive in believing that the world would 
be willing to cooperate to this degree? If in'iny sector all 
the big countries and many small countries participate, 
then a system will be credible and viable. But if coun- 
tries opt out, for political reasons or to protect powerful 
commercial interests, then the system will lack a suffi- 
cient degree of comprehensiveness and lose its credibil- 
ity. Further, an international agency responds to the 
demands of its member countries, particularly as they 
are voiced in the agency's governing body. If national 
representatives speak up in favor of a system, the agency 
will give it attention and an appropriate share of re- 
sources, but if little is said, then the agency is likely to 
squeeze the information system when it comes time to 
divide a budget for which many other programs are com- 
peting. Moreover, let us not be blind to the fact that 
librarians and documentalists are rarely in the foreground 
of attention for the politicians who determine ~riorities 
in both national and international affairs. 
So what has happened in the world at large since 
those glorious days in the late 1960s and early 1970~ ,  
when we could put men on the Moon and everything 
seemed possible? Then it was reasonable to ask for ac- 
tion in the public sector to achieve important objectives; 
now we shrug and say "let the market decide." We be- 
lieve that if there are enough people wanting a particu- 
lar type of information, either it is already on the Internet 
or i t  soon will be. O f  course, there's the rub: what hap- 
pens to the needs of the people who do not have enough 
power in the market to ensure they will be supplied? Do 
governments still have a responsibility to ensure that 
development-scientific and technical, economic and 
social-is not impeded by lack of access to the relevant 
information? 
Let us look at what has happened to INlS and 
AGRIS in this new age of market-based competition. 
Figure 1 shows the annual rate of additions to the two 
databases. INIS reached a peak in 1988 (106,680 new 
records); this achievement was followed by a slow de- 
cline that was probably inevitable given that nuclear 
power was becoming an increasingly mature technology 
and new investments had fallen sharply after the Cher- 
nobyl catastrophe. But AGRIS continued to grow to a 
peak in 1996 (170,284 new records); since then, how- 
ever, it has been in disastrous decline-which cannot 
be explained by any lack of interest in the production 
of food! 
AGRIS had been the FAO's flagship information 
program; it demonstrated a very unusual working part- 
nership between an international agency and almost all 
its member states, constructing a database that was dis- 
tributed on CD-ROM and used throughout the world. 
For some years AGRIS had beer1 the world's fastest- 
growing bibliographic database in agriculture. What 
happened? 
The decline in activity corresponds to the time when 
several senior F A 0  staff members retired. Some of 
these individuals had worked tirelessly for AGRIS for 
two decades or more. They knew their partners in the 
participating countries and engaged them in frequent 
exchanges about the day-to-day functioning of the sys- 
tem. The new people who were recruited to take their 
places had new ideas and probably saw AGRIS as an 
outdated concept. Now the priority was to be an Internet 
service with the FA0  as the source. 
Year 
figure 1. Annual increments to the databases in  numbers of new records: INIS (1970-2001) andAGRIS (1975-2001). 
Communications with the AGRIS partners dried 
up: the big "consultations" were postponed; the process- 
ing of AGRIS records was transferred from Vienna to 
Rome with a further loss of experience and stafE the 
CD-ROM products fell behind schedule. Many of the 
AGRIS partners were sending e-mails to Rome and to 
each other, first asking what was happening and then 
protesting. But gradually they gave up: without encour- 
agement from the FA0 many just stopped sending in- 
put. And the commercial competitors were not asleep. 
Seeing the decline, they were ready to tell potential cli- 
ents that AGRIS was dying and that they should look 
elsewhere for their bibliographic services. The steep de- 
cline shown in Figure 1 was the inevitable result. 
Of  course, this might have been avoided if the par- 
ticipants in AGRIS had been able to talk to their diplo- 
matic representatives and persuade them to make a case 
at the F A 0  for continuing a program that had proved 
so effective over the years. Ultimately, it is the countries 
that have the right to determine the programs of the 
international agencies. They should have been making 
the decisions about an issue as imporrant as the future 
of AGRIS. 
In this final section let us try to look at the prospects for 
broad-based bibliographic services in the future. The 
international cooperative systems obviously have their 
fragilities and inefficiencies. But so do the alternatives. 
The centralized commercial systems, such as CAB Ab- 
stracts or Current Contents, can maintain high levels of 
consistency and scientific rigor, but they are very expen- 
sive and unaffordable for many potential users. 'She 
Internet is a magnificent achievement, a marvelously 
accessible source of every kind of information, yet it is 
wasteful to the extent that different providers are cover- 
ing the same ground but leaving significant gaps. Per- 
haps within the next couple of decades the ideological 
pendulum will swing back, and people will ask whether 
they have had enough ofcompetition and whether there 
is more to gain through cooperation. If so, what are the 
lessons from the past? 
Define scope realistically. In setting up a coopera- 
tive information system, one is seeking to serve a com- 
munity ofinstitutions engaged in the same mission. One 
should know which institutions are to be involved and 
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delimit the scope ofthe system to the interests they have 
in common. That was easy for INIS: most countries had 
established a single powerful institution to look after 
atomic energy. Those institutions already knew each 
other and had met in the IAEA. Together they argued 
over the scope of INIS and implemented it in stages. 
For AGRIS the issue was much more difficult because 
the scope was huge and most countries had several or 
many institutions responsible for agricultural research 
and development. When one of these was chosen as the 
participant in AGRIS, it really needed to organize, at 
least informally, a national mini-AGRIS to engage all 
relevant information producers and thus cover the vari- 
ous facets of the total scope. And as most countries have 
a separate set of institutions for fisheries, this sector 
should have been offered its own separate system. 
The DEVSIS study was also hampered by the great 
number and variety of institutions involved in the mis- 
sion of social and economic development, in this case at 
the international as well as at the national level. There 
was, and there still is, a pressing need for something like 
DEVSIS, and it is unlikely ever to attract the interest of 
commercial providers. So perhaps the question should 
now be revisited at the highest intergovernmental level. 
Iiowever, carefui attention wouid need to be given to 
the definition of scope so that the system would not 
become a basket for anything and everything. 
Be prepared for competition. Competition was not 
a problem for INIS: the AEC fulfilled its own objective 
by abandoning NSA when INIS was in full operation. 
But the situation was quite different for AGRIS, and 
the competition from CAB Abstracts has always been a 
threat to its survival. The members of CAB International 
are the governments of Commonwealth countries, plus 
a few others, and the institution enjoys enough income 
so that it can invite top governmental agricultural scien- 
tists and officials to London, often on a n L n u a l  basis. 
It is perhaps not surprising that many of these become 
partisan and, on returning home, show ambivalence or 
even hostility to their countries' participation in AGRIS. 
Also CAB International is able to advertise its products, 
and, for example, it exhibits at agricultural conferences 
and offers seminars for students in colleges and univer- 
sities. Unfortunately, the F A 0  has never had the re- 
sources to act in like manner. Its slim budget for AGRIS 
- 
was often a target when economies were needed, and 
the national participants were rarely in a position to pro- 
mote the system within their own countries. 
However, competition was not a reason for the fail- 
ure of DEVSIS. Although there were many bibliographic 
services dealing with different aspects of social and eco- 
nomic development, there was a general willingness to 
see these subsumed within LIEVSIS if it could be brought 
into operation. 
Be sure ofpoliticulsupport. As previously explained, 
INIS enjoyed universal political support, not so much 
because ofwhat it would do but because it was seen as a 
potential relief to cold war tensions. Once established 
and with the liaison officers reporting positively to their 
respective governments, INIS has been maintained as 
a long-term component of the IAEA's program. How- 
ever, political support for AGRIS has been intermittent 
and never really strong. After John Sherrod left NAL, 
AGRIS lost one of its most persuasive advocates, and 
his successors have so far not demonstrated a similar 
conviction. If AGRIS is to be resuscitated, it will prob- 
ably require a new commitment by NAL, as well as an 
effort by the U.S. Departments ofAgriculture and State 
to rally the countries that support A G ~ S  and to take 
concerted action requiring the F A 0  to remobilize the 
program. 
There ate also political lessons to be learned from 
the DEVSIS experience. We thought we had a lot of 
support, and on the cover of the study team's report we 
named the IDRC and the fi e intergovernmental orga- 
nizations that cosponsored I he work. But in reality it 
was the secretariats of those organizations that were en- 
gaged in the project, and when it comes to setting up 
new programs or spending money, secretariats need the 
authorization of their member governments. We had 
done very little to mobilize the national governments, 
which was our big mistake. Of  course, perhaps the na- 
tional governments would no have wanted a system such ! 
as DEVSIS, which would haye made it much easier for 
each to find out about the p'rograms of the others and 
what all ofthem had done in the past. This may be cyni- 
cal, but it is easier for a progra oficer to defend a project P if it appears to be innovati e and if relevant previous 
work has disappeared from view. However, only a few 
national governments, either1 in rich or poor countries, 
were aware of what was beink proposed. 
Provide democrutic mechnisms forpolicy formulu- 
tion and oversight. As indicated prev~ousl~, the meet- 
ings of INIS liaison officers have been very influential 
in determining future directions for the system, and the 
lack of such a body has been detrimental for AGRIS. If 
the AGRIS participants had had a stronger voice in policy 
formulation and the management of their system, the 
decline in participation in recent years might have been 
arrested before it became precipitous. 
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